Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/2863
Title: Why Moral Heuristics can Lead to Mistaken Moral Judgments
Authors: Надурак, Віталій Вікторович
Keywords: moral heuristics, subjective rationality, moral decision making, normative criterion, moral standard
Issue Date: 2019
Citation: http://www.kriterion-journal-of-philosophy.org/kriterion/issues/Permanent/Kriterion-nadurak-01.pdf
Abstract: Given the lack of generally accepted moral standards, one of the controversial questions for those who investigate moral heuristics is whether we can argue that moral heuristics can lead to mistaken moral judgments. This paper suggests that, even if we agree that moral standards are different and chosen subjectively, deviations from them are possible and we can prove such deviations in a logically correct way. However, in this case, it must be admitted that not every deviation is a mistake. Deviation becomes a mistake only when a person departs from the standard which she or he considers as right. There are cases where it is impossible to establish the fact of a mistake: when a person chooses a moral standard post hoc, in the light of which the decision would be right (only when there is a deviation from all moral standards which a person considers as right, it is possible to recognize the decision as mistaken). Accepting the idea of the subjectivity of a moral standard, it is also necessary to accept the idea of relativity of moral heuristics: the normative standard chosen by a person also determines which method of moral decision making will be considered as a heuristic.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/2863
Appears in Collections:Статті та тези (ФП)

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
Kriterion-nadurak-01.pdf265.83 kBAdobe PDFView/Open


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.