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## **The Halychyna Assembly. The issue of regional and state unity (1990–1991)**

Both the rise of separatist tendencies, which became apparent toward the end of the 1980s, and the nationalist- and independence-oriented transformation of the nascent Ukrainian state, were vividly reflected in the Ukrainian region of Halychyna. The rebirth of this region and the Ukrainian path to independence have been duly explored in comprehensive works by such scholars as Volodymyr Lytvyn, Stanislav Kulchytsky, Oleksandr Boyko, Kost Bondarenko, and Stepan Kobuta. Ukrainian regional aspirations to greater independence and attitudes among inhabitants of Western areas toward the problem of decentralization nonetheless continue to demand further examination. The reasons for the establishment of the Halychyna Assembly in 1991, as well as its nature and activities, have not been satisfactorily studied; I will therefore in this article evaluate the unifying tendencies of Halychyna society against the background of the wider process of building Ukrainian nationhood and will define the legal status and significance of the assembly.

### **Halychyna's Piedmont**

First, we should observe that the ideological foundations of Galician messianism can probably be found in Julian Baczyński's treatise *Ukraina irredenta* (1895). During the Second World War this ideology was in a sense institutionalized when on 30 June 1941 Ukrainian independence was declared in Lviv, and when detachments of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) were created in the east and west of the country; and further solidified in the postwar era, when the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, intended to fight "for your freedom and ours" was created. Lviv, however, like the rest of the Halychyna region of Ukraine, became a real Ukrainian Piedmont only in the 1950s and '60s, when it was transformed from a Polish city into

a Ukrainian and Ukrainian-speaking one, and in the era of the rise of the anti-Soviet opposition movement and regional dissident activity.<sup>1</sup>

Democratic nationalist organizations created in the Halychyna area toward the end of the 1980s with support from the society of the region were able to engage in a struggle with the Soviet power system which consequently led to independence. In realizing their postulates and ideals, which included all social groups and all regions of Ukraine, representatives of national democracy were looking after the future of the independent nation.<sup>2</sup> At that time Lviv was the least Russian city in the entire European part of the USSR. In Roman Szporluk's opinion, the city, and the whole Lviv area, constituted an anomaly in the years 1990–1991. Not only were they headed in the opposite direction from the republic's other areas, but they also set the tempo of change and offered an example to the entire western region.<sup>3</sup> At the beginning of 1990 Soviet state organizations informed the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party (hereinafter: UCPC) that society in the Lviv area had fallen prey to the idea of “Galician exceptionalism,” i.e. an exaggerated view of Lviv's role in the process of preserving Ukrainian statehood, culture, and language, and in the development of European civilization.<sup>4</sup>

During the elections to the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian S. S. R. (Supreme Council, the Parliament) and local councils in 1990 the democratic camp of the Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil areas obtained a sizeable majority of votes and took power (in the Verkhovna Rada alone the opposition won 43 seats out of 46).<sup>5</sup> This situation allowed the opposition to begin the process of achieving the main goals of their program: the introduction of national symbols, religious and national holidays, changes concerning private property and land ownership, the return of rights to the Greek Catholic Church, the creation of independent mass media, the expansion of party pluralism and de-ideologizing of all areas of social life, the introduction of a local time zone, and the according of veteran status to UPA soldiers.

### Autonomy or Federation?

During the meeting of members of oblast committees and the presidium of the local government with a group of deputies of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR which took place on 30 June 1990 as part of preparatory talks for the first session of the Lviv Oblast Council, the concept of autonomy for western regions took shape. Verkhovna Rada deputy Viacheslav Chornovil in particular called the group's attention to the need for “the establishment of one authority for the entire Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil area, under the condition that party organs [were] not opposed.”<sup>6</sup> Other deputies, who supported the proposal, made an effort to simultaneously show the economic benefits of implementing the plan for the Lviv area. This led not only to reduced organization, discipline and activity among the Communists, but also decreased the numbers of party organizations by 27.6% in the Lviv

<sup>1</sup> M. Riabchuk, *Dvi Ukrainy: realni merezhi, virtualni viiny*, Kyiv 2003, pp. 197–198.

<sup>2</sup> S. Shumliansky, *Rozkol Ukrainy iak virtualna realnist*, in: *Krytyka*, 2002, no. 11, p. 3.

<sup>3</sup> R. Shporliuk, *Imperii ta natsii*, Kyiv, pp. 325, 332–333.

<sup>4</sup> Central State Archive of Public Organizations in Ukraine (hereinafter—CSAPOU), f. 1, op. 32, case # 2872, p. 92.

<sup>5</sup> S. Adamovych, *Problema sobornosti u suspilno-politychnomu zhytti (1991–2004)*, Ivano-Frankivsk 2005, p. 8.

<sup>6</sup> CSAPOU, f. 1, op. 32, case # 2751–266, p. 31.

oblast, 18.7% in the Ivano-Frankivsk oblast, and 10.3% in the Ternopil oblast.<sup>7</sup> In autumn 1990 a correspondent for “Pravda” wrote: “these days being a Communist in Ivano-Frankivsk is not easy. Some have lost themselves completely, while others are changing 'the color of their faith not for Christ, but for a crust of bread.’”<sup>8</sup>

On 18 September 1990, the UCPCC, losing control over the situation in Western Ukraine, published the resolution *On the development of the sociopolitical situation in western regions of the republic and the desire of Party organizations for its stabilization*. The document identified the most dangerous element in the sociopolitical situation as *anti-Communism, which has taken on increasingly open, vulgar and corrupt forms*.<sup>9</sup> In autumn 1990 UCPCC First Secretary Stanislav Hurenko addressed the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU for representatives of security forces and the leadership of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to petition for investigation of possible violations of law by certain councils.<sup>10</sup> On 18 April 1991 the state and party leadership submitted a joint declaration of the UCPCC, Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada and Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR in which authorities in western areas were accused of manipulating national and religious feelings, imposing the idea of “autonomy for Halychyna,” conducting a campaign against the Ukrainian Communist Party and persuading youth to boycott military service in the Soviet Army. The declaration emphasized that similar decisions on the part of other local authorities would be seen as unconstitutional and as such would require their dissolution.<sup>11</sup> It provoked a decisive reaction from Western Ukrainian politicians,<sup>12</sup> who stated that: “we first heard about autonomy from the press, and therefore feel that it has been imposed from above on us too, as it has on the CPUCC, Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada and the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR.”<sup>13</sup>

Faced with this situation, the presidium of the Ternopil Oblast Council remarked in its declaration that the idea of “autonomy for Halychyna” had been proposed by Volodymyr Levchenko, a graduate student at the Advanced Communist Party School in Moscow, and had earlier been thoroughly criticized in the local press.<sup>14</sup> In addition, democratic nationalists in western regions had begun active instructional work in eastern and southern districts of Ukraine. According to the data of the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, the leadership of the National Organization of the Ukrainian National Movement, beginning in January 1991, had organized trips of groups of 100–150 people to eastern districts for purposes of agitation among the local population.<sup>15</sup> Social campaigns organized by western oblast leaders in the east and south of Ukraine were mostly ethnographic and historical cultural in nature. Aiming to unite Ukrainian society, the opposition organized ce-

<sup>7</sup> State Archive of Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast (hereinafter—SAIFO), f. P-1, op. 1, case # 5616, p. 44, 1.

<sup>8</sup> A. Holovenko, H. Iastrebtsov, *Karpaty — hory kruty*, in: *Pravda*, 1990, no. 9, p. 3.

<sup>9</sup> SAIFO, f. P-1, op. 1, case # 5562, p. 1.

<sup>10</sup> M. Odynets, *Na ostrie zhyzni*, in: *Pravda*, 1990, no. 27, pp. 1–2.

<sup>11</sup> O. Boiko, *Ukraina v 1985–1991. Osnovni tendentsii suspilno-politychnoho rozvytku*, Kyiv 2002, p. 143.

<sup>12</sup> Protest statements were made by the Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast Council, the Kalush City and Precinct Council, the Yavoriv Precinct Council, the City Council of Bibrka, the trade-unions of the “Elektron,” “Iskra,” and “Pivdentekhenergo” concerns, the Lviv Ceramic and Sculpture Factory, the Soviet Institute of Planning and Technology in Lviv, and the State Institute of Applied and Decorative Art in Lviv.

<sup>13</sup> CSAPOU, f. 1, op. 32, case # 2751, pp. 58–60, 2–3, 5, 66–67, 98–99, 101.

<sup>14</sup> O. Boiko, *Ukraina v 1985–1991...*, p. 144.

<sup>15</sup> CSAPOU, f. 1, op. 32, case # 2907, p. 1.

lebrations of the anniversary of the union of the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Western Ukrainian People's Republic on 22 January 1919. On the day of the anniversary democratic nationalists organized a symbolic "human chain" which was to unite Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Kyiv.<sup>16</sup> The Andrei Sakharov Russian Cultural Association even organized educational campaigns to inform the citizens of Eastern Ukraine that there was no discrimination against Russians in the west and of the Ukrainian revival's democratic orientation.<sup>17</sup>

Party organs of the eastern and southern districts, however, attempted to use any available means to disrupt the campaign. The activities of western regional leaders also sometimes failed to obtain the support of local society. Pressure from "emissaries of Halychyna" was met with steadily growing unambiguous opposition.<sup>18</sup> The failure of the campaigns conducted in the eastern and western districts was caused by the fact that those involved in the "Halychyna landing," as Ukrainian author Roman Ivanyczuk wrote, acted as missionaries, "insistently demanding the implementation of the national idea"<sup>19</sup> as they propounded it. The situation was exacerbated by individual articles of a radical nationalist nature which appeared in the independent press, calling for increased nationalist antagonism and repression of Communists in the region. Roman Koval's article in the newspaper "Rivne", in which the author treats Russians as guests, for whom "the time has now come to return to their own putrid house," was symptomatic of this tendency.<sup>20</sup>

In response to the developing situation, party and state structures prepared a broad-scale mass media campaign with the aim of discrediting the actions of western oblast councils. The media sought to persuade the public that "the west [was] full of butchers and chauvinists,"<sup>21</sup> and spread the myth of western aspirations for a separate state joined to Poland.<sup>22</sup> Opposition authorities in the western districts were accused of activities leading to the "tightening of the noose around the neck of democracy."<sup>23</sup>

In December 1991 a group of Soviet deputies (V. Fotieiev, S. Shuvalov, V. Shapovalenko) visited the western districts and were persuaded that the society of the region had no intention of creating Western Ukrainian or Halychyna autonomy.<sup>24</sup> What is more, a sociological survey conducted throughout Western Ukraine on 14–18 July 1991 by a group of analysts from the national policy arm of the Central Committee of the CPSU showed that society in the region took a negative view of the possibility of creating a separate state and, most importantly, opposed any such undertaking. Only in the Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk districts did the population express readiness to support the idea of a new Ukrainian nation, while the citizens of Ternopil were indifferent or neutral on this issue.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>16</sup> CSAPOU, f. 1, op. 32, case # 2907, pp. 34, 171.

<sup>17</sup> M. Serheiev, *Rosiiskyi materyk u Lvovi*, in: *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 1991, 6 February, p. 2.

<sup>18</sup> M. Odinets, I. Tikhomirov, *Na trudny rubezhakh*, in: *Pravda*, 1990, 19 December, p. 3.

<sup>19</sup> R. Ivanychuk, *Ne budmo "malorosamy"*, in: *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 1991, 5 February, p. 2.

<sup>20</sup> R. Koval, *Chy povynni ukraintsi dbaty pro dobrobut?*, in: *Rivne*, 27 July, p. 1.

<sup>21</sup> R. Ivanychuk, *Ne budmo "malorosamy"*, in: *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 1991, 5 February, p. 2.

<sup>22</sup> R. Bratun, *Chas prypynyty viinu proty narodu Zakhidnoi Ukrainy*, in: *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 1991, 25 January, p. 2.

<sup>23</sup> V. Drozd, *Udavka. Chto pryshkodyt vo Lvove...*, in: *Pravda*, 1990, 17 October, p. 3.

<sup>24</sup> M. Iakovyna, *Narod spytaie z nas spovna*, in: *Halychyna*, 1990, 19 December, p. 5.

<sup>25</sup> SAIFO, f. P-1, op. 1, case # 5629, pp. 7–8.

A national economic crisis intensified the wave of criticism directed at democratic authorities from the conservative camp. Over the course of five months in 1991 the level of industrial production decreased — compared to an average decrease in the republic as a whole of 4.7% — in the Lviv oblast by 5.8%, the Ternopil oblast by 5.5%, and the Ivano-Frankivsk oblast by 4.7%.<sup>26</sup> The informational campaign aside, the opposition districts were surrounded on the orders of the central authorities by an economic blockade. The Lviv Oblast Council's resolution of 29 November 1990 *On the political situation in the Lviv Oblast and on the defense of democracy* caused considerable anxiety on the part of the authorities. On the basis of that resolution council members established the Civic Consent Committee (KZO), which was supposed to counteract attempts to break up democratic organizations and to control the democratic-nationalist revival. In addition, the chairman of both the Lviv Oblast Council and of the newly created committee, Viacheslav Chornovil, was, in view of the extraordinary circumstances (acts of violence against the authorities and democratic organizations, the introduction of martial law and signing of a new USSR contract against the people's will), given temporary powers to take decisions in the name of the oblast council.<sup>27</sup> At the time of the creation of the KZO, sharp criticisms were voiced in the press.<sup>28</sup> Violations of the Ukrainian SSR Constitution, according to which power belonged to councils alone, were detected in the text of the resolution. Press reports accented the fact that the declaration of an extraordinary situation in certain regions was the prerogative of the Verkhovna Rada of a given republic and called attention to the violation of human rights caused by both the decrease in party numbers in the country and the violation of legal procedures during the holding of the oblast referendum. The deputies resolved to consider the resolution of the Lviv Oblast Council and to conduct a discussion between the presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR and the leadership of the oblast council.<sup>29</sup>

Changes to binding law completed by the local councils of the western regions of the republic were a ubiquitous phenomenon. This was a result of legal radicalism and naive romanticism, in essence based on the conviction that only radical change in the law at the oblast, precinct or city level would lead to corresponding decisions by local councils.<sup>30</sup> It should be noted that within the first half of 1990 alone the newly elected councils issued over 600 acts of legislation which contradicted binding law. The majority of them, in spite of prosecutorial intervention, were not annulled. In this context, the resolution of the Ternopil City Council *First proclamation of the City Council in power*, which appointed the Council “the highest state authority in its jurisdiction, authorized to issue resolutions not in agreement with the obsolete law of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR,” was unprecedented.<sup>31</sup>

On 29 December 1990 the Soviet ministers of the interior and defense issued the decree *On the organization of mutual patrolling by employees of internal affairs organs and soldiers of the Soviet Army and Naval Fleet*. In accordance with the resolution, mutual patrols were conducted throughout the country, composed of functionaries from both groups “in the conditions of the complex sepa-

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid., p. 24.

<sup>27</sup> A. Krasliansky, *Pidmina vlyady, a ne pidmina poniat*, in: *Holos Ukrainy*, 1991, 29 January, p. 3.

<sup>28</sup> SAIFO, f. P-1, op. 1, case # 5639, p. 54.

<sup>29</sup> A. Krasliansky, *Pidmina vlyady, a ne pidmina poniat*, pp. 3, 6.

<sup>30</sup> O. Boiko, *Ukraina v 1985–1991...*, p. 141.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., pp. 158–159.

ratist situation and mass meetings.”<sup>32</sup> For democratic organizations and parties, the decree unambiguously heralded the declaration of an extraordinary state of affairs. The very possibility of its use against the opposition was also disquieting.

The differences taking shape between Halychyna and other Ukrainian regions were exacerbated by their distinct positions toward the referendum on the contract between member states in the Soviet Union. In early February 1991, the Lviv Oblast Council passed the resolution *On maintaining political stability in districts and the position on the Union referendum*. In this document the Council members addressed the Ukrainian SSR parliament with the demand that the referendum be delayed until the new Constitution was ratified and laws for the sovereign nation established. The oblast council also resolved to analyze the resolution introducing military mobilization into the cities of Ukraine, which it considered a violation of law. At the same time, the oblast council made a proposal for the organization of citizens' brigades to fight crime.<sup>33</sup>

The economic and political blockade led to coordination of activities among opposition authorities in different western regions. Corresponding regulations on cooperation between districts were passed and were embodied in daily exchanges of information, in the creation of shared spaces for the production and exchange of goods, and the development of a joint position on government resolutions.<sup>34</sup> All attempts to coordinate the activities of the separate authorities of the three Western Ukrainian districts were to a large extent initiated by Chornovil, who was undoubtedly the leader of the region and a proponent of a federal system for the Ukrainian state. However, as Chornovil himself stressed, Halychyna society was negatively disposed toward the concept of federalism, despite the existence in the past of the ZURL (Western Ukrainian Popular Republic) and the more pronounced national consciousness and organizational capabilities of the region compared to the rest of Ukraine.<sup>35</sup> On 4 January 1991, during the Lviv conference on Ukrainian-Russian Relations in Sovereign Ukraine, Chornovil criticized all attempts to artificially dismember Ukraine and the forceful imposition by the democratic-nationalist camp of Halychyna autonomy. He nonetheless remarked: “We, the representatives of the authorities in the three districts, are going to work together and together establish the Halychyna Assembly, which will include the deputies from all three.”<sup>36</sup>

According to Chornovil, federalization meant maximum independence for the economy of the region, together with greater and definite unity in state ideology and in the creation of cultural and educational structures. As Taras Chornovil remembers, his father had formulated his concept of Ukrainian federalism as early as 1987 during a meeting of the Lviv Discussion Club, but at that time it was met with a critical attitude from those present.<sup>37</sup> Today, however, some of Chornovil's colleagues perceive no hint of a federalist conception in his views at the time of the assembly's establishment. Stepan Davymuka in particular asserts that when the as-

<sup>32</sup> *Prikaz ministra vnutrennykh diel SSSR i ministra oborony SSSR № 449, 513*, in: *Moloda Halychyna*, 1991, 29 January, p. 1.

<sup>33</sup> *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 1991, 5 February, p. 1.

<sup>34</sup> B. Melinyshyn, *Pro diialnist Rad i deputatsku robotu*, in: *Halychyna*, 1991, 2 February, p. 3.

<sup>35</sup> V. Chornovil, *Kompartiiia faktychno isnuie*, in: *Literatura Ukraina*, 1991, 19 September, p. 3.

<sup>36</sup> SAIFO, f.II-1, op. 1, case # 5639, p. 165. V. Chornovil, *Kompartiiia faktychno isnuie*, in: *Literaturna Ukraina*, 1991, 19 September, p. 3.

<sup>37</sup> O. Stetsyshyn, *Avtonomiia chy detsentralizatsiia?*, in: *Ekspres*, 2003, 23–30 January, p. 4.

sembly was taking form Chornovil was merely a proponent of administrative reform, which included as one of its elements the creation of regions corresponding in shape to historic territories.<sup>38</sup> Another proponent of “a certain amount of autonomy for distinct areas or historical regions of Ukraine” was the chairman of the Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast Council, Mykola Yakovyna. He stated that the individual districts should independently decide questions of land ownership, tax and price policy, their regional budgets, and economic and sociocultural development programs.<sup>39</sup>

### From Oblast Council to Halychyna Assembly

At the beginning of 1991 the leadership of the three oblast councils decided to conduct a group session in Lviv of the oblast authorities of Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Ternopil.<sup>40</sup> During the press conference on 8 February 1991, Chornovil gave the following reasons for calling the joint meeting: political uniformity of the region (predomination of democratic forces), an effort to overcome the economic blockade, similar positions toward the coming referendum and opposition to the territorial pretensions of neighboring countries. Invoking not the decision of the Popular Meeting of 1939, but the unification act of 22 January 1919, Chornovil stated that the theme of the session would be “economic cooperation in the region,” adding, “please do not identify this as an attempt to establish some kind of autonomy for Halychyna.”<sup>41</sup>

Cooperation between the districts led to the convocation on 16 February 1991 in Lviv of a joint session of the oblast councils of Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, and Lviv, to be called the Halychyna Assembly. At the session two issues were discussed: “a general framework for economic cooperation in the region” and “the regional political situation and the all-Union referendum.”<sup>42</sup> The Halychyna Assembly took on particular political importance due to the participation of deputies from the Rivne, Volyn, Chernihiv, Zhytomyr and Vinnytsia districts and delegates from democratic sociopolitical organizations from Moscow, Zakarpattia, Chernihiv, Cherkasy and other oblasts.<sup>43</sup> About 1,200 people took part in the deliberations of the assembly. Among those present were the Polish consul in Lviv, Janusz Łukasze-wski, and a member of the Club of Rome, Bohdan Havrylyshyn. The invited guests numbered approximately 800.<sup>44</sup> The Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the republic was represented at the assembly by a group of six deputies led by the first deputy of Verkhovna Rada chairman Ivan Plyushch. Representatives of all Christian faiths were also present at the assembly meeting, which, given the extremely tense state of religious affairs at that time, could only be seen as a positive development.<sup>45</sup>

In his speech, Chornovil stressed the purpose of the gathered assembly: “If the nation chooses the path of nation-statehood, the issue of autonomy for Haly-

<sup>38</sup> S. Davymuka, *Dytia Halychyny — ne separatyzm, a sobornist*, in: *Vysokyi zamok*, 2004, 11 December, p. 3.

<sup>39</sup> *Try zapytannia holovi oblasnoi Rady*, in: *Halychyna*, 1991, 3 January, pp. 1–2.

<sup>40</sup> M. Iakovyna, *Khto dilyt i ruiniuie sobornu Ukrainu?*, in: *Lvivska hazeta*, 2004, 23 December, p. 4.

<sup>41</sup> CSAPOU, f. 1, op. 32, case # 2899–252, pp. 68, 76.

<sup>42</sup> V. Shliakhtych, *Ne vidokremlivatsia, a iednatysia*, in: *Prykarpatska pravda*, 1991, 19 February, p. 1.

<sup>43</sup> *Halyska asambleia*, in: *Halychyna*, 1991, 19 February, pp. 1–2.

<sup>44</sup> CSAPOU, f. 1, op. 32, case # 2899–252, p. 104.

<sup>45</sup> B. Hnatovsky, *Hurtuimosia, bratove*, in: *Moloda Halychyna*, 1991, 19 February, p. 1.

chyna will be abandoned and along with it her separate political future. Only the geographical term will remain ... But the transformation of Ukraine into a shapeless colonial possession will inevitably lead to a rise in isolationism and force us to look for ways to preserve our national and political consciousness, our culture and spirituality.”<sup>46</sup>

Certain hints at the idea of autonomy could be found in the text of the speech by Bohdan Boyko, the first deputy of the chairman of the Ternopil Oblast Executive Committee, who justified cooperation between regions by the necessity for “the creation of a separate economic system, parallel to the state economy, explicitly linked with opposition to the political and economic dictate of the Kremlin, and to the centralizing tendencies taking shape in Kyiv.”<sup>47</sup> At the same time, it is important to observe that the leaders of the western oblasts emphasized the absence of separatist tendencies. The chairman of the Ternopil Oblast Council affirmed that the Halychyna Assembly would “take no steps in the direction of separatism, but intend[ed] to work together, having in mind the interests of the nation as a whole and the good of society, acting in accordance with the agreements and laws of the Ukrainian state.”<sup>48</sup> In addition, Bohdan Oliinyk declared the transparency of the assembly, in which, he stated, no-one would “take any secret decisions or operate by reckless methods.”<sup>49</sup>

The main representatives of executive authorities of western oblasts presented the deputies with a general conception of economic cooperation in the region. The plan included cooperation between industrial plants of the three neighboring oblasts, which aimed to saturate the market with food products. An increase in production of consumer goods and building materials was envisaged. A plan for exchanging new information and experiences, and for taking advantage of the existing potential for scientific development and preparing administrative cadres, was also proposed.<sup>50</sup> As Stepan Davymuka observed, the Halychyna sphere should develop one line of investment, one environmental protection program, one financial credit and price program. Furthermore, close cooperation in commercial, marketing and recruitment needed to be undertaken, while in the future a process of specialization among oblasts was bound to take place in the region<sup>51</sup>.

The convocation of the Halychyna Assembly prompted the leadership of economic organizations to initiate close cooperation in the three oblasts. One month later they had developed coordinated development programs for the priority industries of the nation's economy. To politicians, the engineering, chemical and pharmaceutical industries held long-range promise.<sup>52</sup> In order to improve joint economic enterprises, they presented, among other things: a plan to hold a series of practical and educational conferences, and open shops in Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk and Lviv. They also planned to mobilize production of buses, trucks, cranes,

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<sup>46</sup> V. Chornovil, *Do nezalezhnosti — myrnym shliakhom*, in: *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 1991, 21 February, p. 2.

<sup>47</sup> B. Boiko, *Iedynym frontom — proty dyktatu Kremli*, in: *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 1991, 26 February, p. 2.

<sup>48</sup> *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 1991, 16 February, p. 1.

<sup>49</sup> B. Hnatovsky, *Hurtuimosia, bratove*, in: *Moloda Halychyna*, 1991, 19 February, p. 1.

<sup>50</sup> *Halytska asambleia*, in: *Halychyna*, 1991, 19 February, pp. 1–2.; V. Pavlyk, *Spivpratsia: novi mozhlyvosti*, in: *Halychyna*, 1991, 21 February, p. 3.

<sup>51</sup> M. Petrychuk, *V iednosti — nasha syla*, in: *Halychyna*, 1991, 21 February, p. 4.

<sup>52</sup> *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 1991, 23 February, p. 1.



and articles of daily use (e.g., matches and bottles), create an association of textile and knitted goods factories, and open a tourist-recreational complex.<sup>53</sup>

In early April 1991, at a meeting of the Coordinative Council of the Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Ternopil oblasts, national workers' organizations were created: a council fund and a commission for the development of regional economic contacts. These structures were to consist of eight people, and each oblast would be obligated to pay 100,000 karbovantsy to the shared fund. The representatives of the executive structures of the three oblasts also made a plan of priority action for 1991.<sup>54</sup>

The mind responsible for the creation of a scientific-methodical base which was intended to contribute to the economic unification of the region was a Ph.D in economics, Marian Dolishnyi. The scholarly infrastructure of the union was to be the Institute of Economics of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences of which he was head. At the administrative level, the plan was to present the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR with a program for reconstruction of power structures throughout Halychyna, relying on the experience of western countries.<sup>55</sup>

The editors of newspapers in the three oblasts also expressed readiness to cooperate. On 21 May 1991 the editors of "Halychyna" ("Галичина"), from Ivano-Frankivsk and "Za vilnu Ukrainu" ("За вільну Україну"), from Lviv, agreed to work together in the preparation and exchange of information and in editing an English-language bulletin for diplomats and foreign mass media.<sup>56</sup>

The legal foundations of the Halychyna Assembly were contained in the agreement *On fundamental rules for cooperation between Councils of deputies from the Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Ternopil oblasts*. On the basis of the agreement, the parties bound themselves to maintain mutual contact through joint seminars and consultations. They were also obligated to initiate processes aimed at protecting the food market, conducive to development of the infrastructure of production plants based on joint administrative and investment policy and regional environmental protection, expand cooperation in the realm of commerce, and assist the organization and development of sociocultural and academic relationships.<sup>57</sup>

The agreement was concluded for the length of the term of office of local councils, whereas each participant in the assembly had the right, in accordance with the decision of a session of the relevant oblast council, to dissolve the agreement, on condition they give the other parties no less than a year's notice. To streamline cooperation, a resolution was passed creating a coordinative council with a workers' organization in Lviv, whose competences would serve to help draw up consultative resolutions that could influence public opinion. A computer database was also created to store information and keep it regularly updated.<sup>58</sup> The chair and vice

<sup>53</sup> B. Vovk, A. Nedilsky, Ia. Iakymovych, *Perspektyva v konstruktyvizmi*, in: *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 1991, 29 March, p. 1.

<sup>54</sup> B. Kozlovsky, *Vid sirnyka do avtobusa*, in: *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 1991, 5 April, p. 1.

<sup>55</sup> *Sesiia Lvivskoi oblasnoi Rady narodnykh deputativ. Odyn rik pry vladi*, in: *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 1991, 27 March, p. 1.

<sup>56</sup> B. Vovk, *Na stezhtsi iednannia*, in: *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 1991, 22 May, p. 2.

<sup>57</sup> SAIFO, f. П-1, op. 1, case # 5632, pp. 5–6.; *Uhoda Ivano-Frankivskoi, Lvivskoi, Ternopilskoi oblasnykh Rad narodnykh deputativ "Pro osnovni pryntsyipy spivrobotnytstva mizh oblasnyimi Radamy narodnykh deputativ Ivano-Frankivskoi, Lvivskoi ta Ternopilskoi oblasti"*, in: *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 1991, 21 February, p. 1.

<sup>58</sup> CSAPOU, f. 1, op. 32, case # 2899–252, pp. 116–117.

chairpersons of the oblast councils and of oblast executive committees formed the coordinative council, which numbered twelve members.<sup>59</sup>

It is important to note that in the text of the agreement there is no passage suggesting a separatist or autonomist program behind the resolution. Instead, the content of the document indicates Halychyna society's effort to enter into regional economic cooperation. UCP analysts were of the opinion that in passing a resolution on economic partnership, the Lviv Oblast Council had taken the initiative which other areas of the party-state and academic establishment of the republic could follow.<sup>60</sup>

Western Ukrainian politicians assigned great importance to the assembly's resolution *On the unity of Ukrainian territory*. In the document the Halychyna community condemned "any endeavor which aims to violate the territorial unity of Ukraine," while the legal basis establishing Western Ukrainian territories as part of Ukraine was provided by the unification act of the ZURL and URL from 22 January 1919.<sup>61</sup> The resolution also addressed the Volyn, Zakarpattia, Rivne, and Chernivtsi Oblast Councils with a proposal for ratification of the main points of the Halychyna Assembly's resolution. The agreement approved by the assembly contained a proposal for the creation of political and legal underpinnings for Ukrainian national unity, which was directed to the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR.<sup>62</sup> The assembly also approved the resolution *On holding an oblast-wide referendum on 17 March 1991*, the purpose of which was to introduce a different ballot in Western Ukrainian oblasts. The ballot was to bear the following question: *Do you agree for Ukraine to become an independent nation, a nation which independently resolves all problems of domestic and foreign policy and guarantees equal civil rights regardless of national and religious identity?*<sup>63</sup>

Deputy Vasyl Chervonii criticized the decision to introduce the new ballot, in whose content he perceived an element harmful to the unification of Ukraine. He declared that "the Halychyna ballot is not in Halychyna's own best interest. In Volyn, and even more so in Great Ukraine, such a concept will not get the support it needs."<sup>64</sup> Most of the delegates, however, came to the conclusion that since the population of Halychyna amounted to almost 10% of the population of the republic, their voice needed to be heard.<sup>65</sup> The idea of conducting a referendum in the oblast was also criticized by political organizations on the radical right. In particular Yurii Shukhevych, leader of the Interparty Assembly, considered the resolution to conduct the referendum a mistake and called for a boycott of it. In his opinion, the Ukrainian nation was under occupation by the USSR, and the occupier — according to international legislation — had no right to conduct any kind of referendum on

<sup>59</sup> SAIFO, f. II-1, op. 1, case # 5632, p. 2. *Ukhvala obiednanoi sesii Ivano-Frankivskoi, Lvivskoi, Ternopilskoi oblasnykh Rad narodnykh deputativ "Pro rehionalnu Koordinatsiinu radu"*, in: *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 1991, 21 February, p. 1.

<sup>60</sup> CSAPOU, f. 1, op. 32, case # 2899–252, p. 110.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 113.

<sup>62</sup> SAIFO, f. II-1, op.1, case # 5632–6, p. 3. *Ukhvala obiednanoi sesii Ivano-Frankivskoi, Lvivskoi, Ternopilskoi oblasnykh Rad...*, p. 2.

<sup>63</sup> *Ukhvala obiednanoi sesii Ivano-Frankivskoi, Lvivskoi, Ternopilskoi oblasnykh Rad...*, p. 2; SAIFO, f. II-1, op.1, case # 5632–6, p. 4; CSAPOU, f. 1, op. 32, case # 2899–252, p. 114.

<sup>64</sup> CSAPOU, f. 1, op. 32, case # 2899–252, p. 108.

<sup>65</sup> I. Hulyk, Ia. Kolesa, Ia. Iakymovych, *Halytska Asambleia: iednannia v imia sviatoi mety*, in: *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 1991, 19 February, p. 1.

occupied soil. Moreover, Shukhevych criticized Chornovil's proposal for a Ukrainian federal system.<sup>66</sup>

At the beginning of March 1991, the Lviv oblast was paid a visit by the chair of the Ukrainian SSR Verkhovna Rada, Leonid Kravchuk. He called for an end to all conflicts with Communist Party representatives.<sup>67</sup> He was simultaneously forced to admit that “We see real changes in the social mood of the Lviv oblast and this very fact should be a point of reference in making subsequent decisions.”<sup>68</sup> What is more, as Davymuka stated, the leadership of the oblasts was entering “good and substantial relations” both with the leadership of the Council of Ministers and with the Cabinet of Ministers.<sup>69</sup> It should be noted that the cooperation process with republic authorities was a fruitful one. The decisions of the Lviv Oblast Executive Committee concerning Customs, regulation of the domestic market and improvement of relations with the military, in particular, became the basis for corresponding resolutions approved by the Cabinet of Ministers and the Verkhovna Rada.<sup>70</sup>

### The Assembly vs. the Union of Communists

During the session of the Halychyna Assembly representatives of the Communist Party, who remained a minority (60 persons, of 380 deputies present), not only made little effort to defend and showed little commitment to defending the idea of a united Ukraine, but most importantly, did not oppose holding an oblast referendum. The situation which arose must be explained by psychological pressure, a previously prepared list of speakers, and the fact that the Communists did not familiarize themselves with drafts of the resolution. We should, however, observe that the Communists in the Ternopil Oblast Council had the intention of introducing alternate draft versions. In case of necessity, they wanted to present a corresponding petition or even walk out of the session. However, at the meeting of the group of Communists in the Ternopil Oblast Council, the participants were informed that Plyushch did not see signs of anti-government activity in the Lviv resolution drafts and this fact had significant influence on the Council members' position.<sup>71</sup>

The Communists' position was forcefully presented by Ivano-Frankivsk UCP Oblast Committee First Secretary Zinovii Kuravskyi in his speech at the assembly meeting. On the one hand, he supported the resolution *On the unity of Ukrainian territory*, while on the other hand, he opposed its disregard for the unification processes of 1939. He proposed that the text of the resolution make reference to the decision of the People's Conference of Western Ukraine (October 1939) and the First Congress of People's Committees of Zakarpattia (November 1944). The Communists also maintained that the referendum should proceed according to the republican scenario, which was meant to have the consequence of protecting the assembly from charges of separatism or lack of a specific position.<sup>72</sup> The Com-

<sup>66</sup> V. Tereshchuk, *Chy boikot — naikrashcha taktyka?*, in: *Moloda Halychyna*, 1991, 23 February, p. 1.

<sup>67</sup> O. Telenchi, A. Krasliansky, *Siiaty zerna zlahody*, in: *Holos Ukrainy*, 1991, 6 March, p. 2.

<sup>68</sup> O. Telenchi, A. Krasliansky, *A ide vesna... Zavershyvsia vizyt L. Kravchuka na Lvivshchynu*, in: *Holos Ukrainy*, 1991, 7 March, p. 3.

<sup>69</sup> S. A. Davymuka, *Potribni rishuchi dii*, in: *Uriadovyi kurier*, 1991, nr 10, p. 6.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> CSAPOU, f. 1, op. 32, case # 2899–252, pp. 109–110.

<sup>72</sup> Z. V. Kuravsky, *Diiaty v interesach liudei*, in: *Prykarpatska pravda*, 1991, 19 February, p. 1.

munists also underscored the necessity of preserving a reformed Soviet Union. In the very idea of Ukraine's secession from the USSR they saw a real threat to her national unity from the territorial claims of certain other countries and Soviet republics.<sup>73</sup>

The situation was further exacerbated by the mass media, which transmitted false information regarding the convocation of the assembly. On 17 February 1991, the television news informed their audience that the representatives of the united sessions of the three oblasts had expressed their support for an agreement between the member states of the Soviet Union.<sup>74</sup> The news on the USSR-wide radio station Maiak for unknown reasons not only omitted any mention of the resolution *On the unity of Ukrainian territory*, approved during the assembly session, but attempted to create a false image of Halychyna separatism.<sup>75</sup> Furthermore, although coverage of the joint session in the regional Communist press was mostly positive, there was some stress on the point that "there are certain fears concerning the joint session, which could become a step toward autonomy."<sup>76</sup> On 28 February 1991 the statement of the Ivano-Frankivsk UCP Oblast Committee and the CPSU stressed that "the papers published by local councils have called for a physical crackdown on Communists, while with regard to some publications we have cause to speak of calls to armed conflict, civil disobedience, strikes and a boycott of the all-Union referendum."<sup>77</sup>

In response to the convocation of the assembly, the Communists organized a meeting of representatives of UCP Party Committees of the Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Ternopil oblasts. Delegates of Party workers from the Volyn, Zakarpattia, Rivne, and Chernivtsi oblasts, and scientists from the Institute of Social Sciences of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Kyiv Institute of Political Science and Social Administration took part.<sup>78</sup> The participation of Hryhorii Harchenko, Second Secretary of the UCPCC, and Volodymyr Tiunenev, director of the UCPCC sector of departments, as well as acting UCPCC organizer Oleksandr Margalitadze, in the sessions testifies to the importance assigned to coordinating the activities of Halychyna committees. Among the 250 participants present, there were correspondents from "Pravda," "Robitnycha Hazeta" and "Silski Visti".

The plan to coordinate the interactions of Communist Party representatives of the western oblasts was first formulated 20 November 1990 by the Rivne City UCP Committee. The idea had the support of the Staryi Sambir UCP Committee, which simultaneously proposed the organization of a conference of Communist Party leaders from the western oblasts with the president of the USSR. Meanwhile regional Party leadership resolved to call together a conference of regional Communist Party secretaries and members of the bureau which UCPCC First Secretary Stanislav Hurenko would attend. The meeting took place on 14 February 1991 in Ivano-Frankivsk.<sup>79</sup> During the conference the Communists of the region underscored the need to develop a joint plan for coordinated action and exchange of experien-

<sup>73</sup> SAIFO, f. II-1, op. 1, case # 5618-38, p. 38.

<sup>74</sup> *Telehrama*, in: *Halychyna*, 1991, 21 February, p. 2.

<sup>75</sup> I. Hulyk, Ia. Kolesa, Ia. Iakymovych, *Halyska Asambleia: iednannia v imia viatoi mety*, in: *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 1991, 19 February, p. 1.

<sup>76</sup> *Telehrama*, in: *Halychyna*, 1991, 21 February, p. 2.

<sup>77</sup> SAIFO, f. II-1, op. 1, case # 5630-94, p. 17.

<sup>78</sup> *Diiaty skoordynovano vyrishyly na naradi v Ivano-Frankivsku predstavnyky partiinykh komitetiv KPU zakhidnykh oblastei*, in: *Prykarpatska pravda*, 1991, 21 February, p. 1.

<sup>79</sup> SAIFO, f. II-1, op. 1, case # 5634-16, pp. 8, 15-16.

ces. They expressed support for the councils' actions under the condition that the councils would be guided by the interests of the larger society and would aim at consolidating all social groups.<sup>80</sup> During the session they passed the resolution: *Main directions for coordinated action by UCPCC Party Committees of the Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Ternopil oblasts*. The document dealt with uniformity in propaganda activity, support for developing more objective histories of the Ukraine and USSR, opposition to acts of persecution against Communists, focusing action on major socioeconomic problems, organizing regular meetings of Communists with deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR, and opposing attempts to destroy the authority and the intellectual heritage of Vladimir I. Lenin. Session participants also planned to use Communist Party deputies to force the Verkhovna Rada to amend the decisions taken by local councils and their Executive Oblast Committees, which remained at variance with binding law.<sup>81</sup>

On 2 March 1991 the Lviv Oblast Committee of the UCP responded to the resolutions of the Halychyna Assembly, approving separate resolutions. The Communists, fearing the collapse of Ukrainian territorial unity, stressed that the legal basis for the process of Ukrainian national unification should be the will of society legally confirmed by the People's Conference of Western Ukraine and the First Congress of People's Committees of Zarkapattia. The Communists also pronounced the resolution on holding an oblast referendum on 17 March 1991 to be legally groundless.<sup>82</sup>

The situation developing in the region was harshly criticized by Communist Party leadership. In a speech on Ukrainian television on 14 March 1991, UCPCC First Secretary Stanislav Hurenko spoke of the complex socioeconomic situation in the country, of acts of lawlessness, and conscious disregard for the Constitutions of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR. According to Hurenko, the Halychyna Assembly's actions were signs not only of the danger of "Ukraine breaking away from the Soviet Union, but also the danger of federalization, the reshaping of the nation into individual republics, to be ruled by newly chosen hetmans."<sup>83</sup> The Central Committee of the Communist Party with the resolution *On political solidarity and moral and material support for Communists and Party Committees of the republic's western oblasts* on 28 May 1991 took the decision to intensify and systematize contacts between Party committees of the eastern and western regions of the republic.<sup>84</sup> However, the resolution, the main purpose of which was to strengthen Western Ukrainian Party organizations, in reality was conducive to a rapprochement and improved communication between elites in opposite parts of the country.

On 10 July 1991 the UCPCC secretariat approved a resolution which constituted a reaction to the creation of the Halychyna Assembly. Specifically, in connection with the sessions of the assembly, it was proposed to the Oblast Party Committees of Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Ternopil that a Union of Communist Deputies for the three oblasts be created and a future plan of action be determined

<sup>80</sup> *Diiaty skoordynovano vyrishyly...*, op. cit., p. 1.

<sup>81</sup> CSAPOU, f. 1, op. 32, case # 2907, p. 59.; SAIFO, f. II-1, op. 1, case # 5633, pp. 28–31.

<sup>82</sup> SAIFO, f. II-1, op. 1, case # 5639, pp. 36, 42–45.

<sup>83</sup> S. Hurenko, *Na zasadakh ravnopravnosti*, in: *Holos Ukrainy*, 1991, 15 March, p. 3.

<sup>84</sup> CSAPOU, f. 1, op. 32, case # 2907, p. 122.

for them, addressing the most important issues.<sup>85</sup> The proposal set the deadline for the creation of the Union as 15 August 1991.<sup>86</sup>

### The Halychyna Assembly — not in the immediate future

The results of the referendum in March 1991 confirmed the distinct position of Halychyna society on the question of the USSR's preservation. In Lviv oblast, 89.6% voted for a regional ballot; in Ivano-Frankivsk oblast, 90%, and in Ternopil oblast — 85.3%. Chornovil saw the referendum results as a sign of “our fidelity to the idea of the Halychyna Assembly.”<sup>87</sup> Similarly, on 16 June 1991, during a meeting in Ternopil, Bohdan Boyko, first deputy of the chairman of the Oblast Executive Committee, returned to the idea of creating a Ukrainian nation in the Halychyna region of Ukraine. “If the agreement between member states of the Soviet Union is signed,” he stated, “we will be forced to take on the question of a Republic of Halychyna.”<sup>88</sup>

On June 18 the coordinative council of the western oblast councils, based on the results of the nationwide referendum, made an appeal to the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR, in which it stated that “the majority of the Ukrainian population would vote for independence, on condition that the analogous question were posed, and if a democratic pre-referendum campaign were assured.” Among other arguments it made against a new Union agreement, the appeal stated that “the plan for a Union agreement has not been subject to wide public debate and at the same time its ratification would violate the Verkhovna Rada resolution of 17 October 1990.” It was furthermore noted that only a sovereign nation could conclude an agreement with other nations.<sup>89</sup>

Faced with the August putsch of 1991, the leaders of the National Emergency Committee again attempted to take advantage of the “exceptional” status of the Western Ukrainian oblasts. Valentin Varennikov, commander of the USSR land forces, explaining the necessity for declaring a state of emergency in the republic in a conversation with Leonid Kravchuk on 19 August 1991, stated that “In Western Ukraine Soviet authority is absent, and the uniform Movement is present. In the western oblasts there is no choice but to declare a state of emergency.”<sup>90</sup>

After the failed provocation by the National Emergency Committee, and after the announcement on 24 August 1991 of the Ukrainian Independence Act, the leaders of the democratic movement in Halychyna concentrated their efforts on national politics. Chornovil and Levko Lukianenko took part in the pre-election battle for the presidency, which had the effect of putting the idea of Ukrainian federalization on the backburner. As Iaroslav Radevych-Vynnytsky has perceptively observed, “Chornovil failed to pass the baton of Ukrainian federalization to anyone,” and thus — as the scholar diplomatically puts it — the idea remains a matter for

<sup>85</sup> SAIFO, f. II-1, op. 1, case # 5616, p. 175.

<sup>86</sup> SAIFO, f. II-1, op. 1, case # 5562, p. 12.

<sup>87</sup> V. Chornovil, *Teper ia tverdo stoiu na nohakh*, in: *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 1991, 19 March, p. 1.

<sup>88</sup> SAIFO, f. II-1, op. 1, case # 5622, p. 108.

<sup>89</sup> *Zvernennia do Verkhovnoi Rady URSS vid Koordynatsiinoi rady oblasnykh Rad narodnykh deputativ Ivano-Frankivskoi, Lvivskoi, Ternopilskoi oblastei*, in: *Holos Ukrainy*, 1991, 27 June, p. 3.

<sup>90</sup> O. Boiko, *Ukraina v 1985–1991...*, p. 249.

the future, though not the immediate future.<sup>91</sup> Stepan Davymuka believes that Chornovil gave up on the idea of the Halychyna Assembly under the influence of sharp criticism which viewed the union as a sign of separatism.<sup>92</sup> In the opinion of Oleh Havych, Chornovil did not see the assembly as a foundation for building autonomy, only as a trampoline by which he could take power in Kyiv. Havych also agrees with the view that limits were put on the assembly's activities from the moment Kravchuk convinced Chornovil that it could become a cause of dangerous separatism in Halychyna.<sup>93</sup>

The situation which arose, however, in connection with the battle for the presidency in the runup to the election, led to the convocation on 5 September 1991 of a second meeting of deputies from the Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Ternopil Oblast Councils, which took place in Ternopil in the Les Kurbas “Berezil” Palace of Culture. Council members, representatives of different political parties, civil society organizations, clergy and the Ukrainian diaspora were present at the session meetings. Delegates from the Vinnytsia, Volyn, Zakarpattia, Khmelnytskyi and other oblasts also attended.<sup>94</sup> The eastern oblasts' position on the successive convocation of the assembly was present by Leonid Yakovyshyn, deputy from Chernihiv oblast: “Today we must attend as quickly as possible to economic law, which would unite us in one Ukrainian nation. We hope that Halychyna will initiate this process.”

The second session of the Halychyna Assembly most probably sought to support Viacheslav Chornovil as candidate for the presidency of Ukraine. During the session, Dmytro Pavlychko appealed to both Chornovil himself and Lukianenko: “My friends, yield some ground to each other [...] Don't break our hearts in two. We value each of you equally.” Later, however, deputies from the three oblast councils were nearly unanimous in supporting Chornovil's candidacy.<sup>95</sup>

During the assembly session the government economic stabilization program was pronounced unsatisfactory, and a Halychyna Executive Committee was simultaneously formed, which was to be responsible for reorganizing regional commerce. The chairman of the Committee, Viktor Pynzenyk, defined one of the tasks of the newly created structure as assistance to enterprise and the development of a normalized time-frame for privatization.<sup>96</sup> In order to incorporate the resolution approved by the assembly into everyday life, a working group on legislative matters under the direction of Mykola Yakovyna was created, which was to prepare plans for legislation by organizational structures of executive authorities and local governments. The group developed legal plans for government and national administration and defined the legal status of the oblast, based on the concept of a united but decentralized nation, with highly developed local and regional governments.

One result of the Halychyna Executive Committee's work was the program for transforming manufacturing unions, which was aimed at raising the level of internal cooperation. Plans for creating new centers of production were also develo-

<sup>91</sup> Y. Radevych-Vynnytsky, *Chy oshchaslyvyt Ukrainu federalizatsiia*, in: *Rozbudova derzhavy*, 1993, nr 6, p. 64.

<sup>92</sup> S. Davymuka, *Nezabutnii narodnyi holova. Lvivskyi period derzhavotvorchoi diialnosti V. Chornovola 1990-1992 rokiv*, in: *Molod Ukrainy*, 2003, 11 April, p. 2.

<sup>93</sup> O. Khavych, *Smert Halychyny*, <http://www.rukhpress.com.ua>.

<sup>94</sup> B. Hnatovsky, *Na vsikh bulav ne vystachyt*, in: *Moloda Halychyna*, 1991, 7 September, p. 1.

<sup>95</sup> B. Hnatovsky, *Koly z ochei ziide poluda*, in: *Moloda Halychyna*, 1991, 12 September, p. 1.

<sup>96</sup> V. Pynzenyk, *Komitet stvorenyi dlia toho, aby z chasom vidpala neobkhidnist u ioho isnuvanni*, in: *Moloda Halychyna*, 1991, 17 September, p. 2.

ped. Due to intensification of the centralizing tendencies of the executive authority system and changes of oblast council leadership, however, cooperation through the Halychyna Assembly remained limited.<sup>97</sup>

## Conclusion

The national democratic rebirth of Halychyna Ukraine began with the victory of the democratic-nationalist camp in the 1990 elections. Yet the economic and governmental blockade, the attempt by Communist state structures to weaken democratic forces in the western oblasts, and fears related to the proclamation of independence forced the leadership of the western oblasts to make a joint effort to actualize the democratic-nationalist idea through the Halychyna Assembly.

The assembly's activities contradict the accusations made against it of separatist tendencies. In truth, it testified to the Halychyna community's ambition to play a leading role in market reforms and democratic change throughout all Ukraine. The consistent position of Halychyna Assembly leaders on nationhood resisted pressures from conservative forces. The assembly's efforts led not only to the creation of a program of deregulation and economic reform, but also to the transfer of administrative power to the local level. With Ukraine's attainment of independence, politicians in the western oblasts vied for the presidency and focused their energy on the continuing task of developing nationhood; in doing so, they stepped out onto the stage of Ukraine-wide politics.

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<sup>97</sup> S. Davymuka, *Nezabutnii narodnyi holova. Lvivskiyi period derzhavotvorchoi diialnosti V. Chornovola 1990-1992 rokiv*, in: *Molod Ukrainy*, 2003, 11 April, p. 2.; M. Yakovyna, *Khno dilyt i ruiniue sobornu Ukrainu?*, in: *Lvivska hazeta*, 2004, 23 December, p. 4.