

---

## **Institutionalization of ethnic political actors in Austria-Hungary: The examples of Galicia and Bukovyna**

Monolatii Ivan S.

Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University, Ukraine,  
iwan.monolatiij@gmail.com

**Received:** 15.01.2014

**Abstract:** The article examines the institutional processes in the ethnopolitics of Austro-Hungary concerned with the rights and needs of ethnic actors and the processes of internal and external institutionalization of Ukrainian, Polish, Jewish, Romanian and German political actors in Galicia and Bukovyna. The legal basis for the formalization of political participation of citizens and the policy priorities of the state are characterized in terms of ethnic awakening. We trace a genesis of ethnic catalyst of the political mobilization and determine the relationship between the occupational structure and the lines of social division expressed in the ethnic terms. The platforms and strategies of the political parties founded along the ethnic lines are analyzed. We also examine the mobilization factors of electoral and protest participations, the catalysts of competition among the ethno-national communities with different statuses, the variability of protection of the group interests, and the compromises and consensuses of the formalized and unformalized ethnic actors.

**Keywords:** institutionalization, ethnic political actors, politicization of ethnicity, ethnic policy of state, political participation, political mobilization, protection of group interests, ethnic conflict, inter-ethnic compromise, inter-ethnic interaction.

**UDC:** 323.21 (477.8)

The constitutional reforms of the 1860s carried out by the Austro-Hungarian state have created normative and legal bases for governmental formalization of political participation. The state laid the foundation of appropriate ‘institutional design’ and the reliable mechanisms of social interaction favourable for ensuring constitutional rights and freedoms, thus ensuring participation of different ethnicity bearers in the electoral process and, in particular, forming the basis for electoral participation of the voters as capable citizens of the state [1, p. 647]. Of paramount importance was ethno-national policy of the state which harmonized relations between the state and the ethnic minorities, and ensured their rights and implementation of a certain ethno-political model. Its components were legitimation of power, restriction of the amplitude of probable actions of the ethnic minorities within a formalized legal framework, neutralization of their ethnic separatism and possible claims for power in the country, harmonization of the interaction of ethnic communities, and simultaneous formation of ethno-nations [2, p. 72]. However, the state used confrontational methods with regard to ‘*aliens*’. First and foremost, the government practiced imposing and preserving vertical inter-ethnic relations, and meeting the interests of the titular ethnic groups at the expense of the ‘*aliens*’. The latter had not yet been recognized as separate ethnic communities. This especially concerned Jews who were on their ‘way to equality’. This testified to a segregation model of the ethnic policy applied to them. In the chronotope in question, the state authorities pursued an ‘attacking’ policy with regard to the group interests of Ukrainians and Jews.

---

The construction of vertical inter-ethnic relations was reduced to a common denominator that positioned the state as an unconditional advocate of the titular/Polish ethno-nation, especially in Galicia. Under those conditions, the state faced a dilemma whether to create the opportunities for the ethnic minorities to foster their cultural resources and impose social and cultural values of the 'nation-and-state' upon those minorities, or to combine harmoniously those values with the '*aliens*' and apply certain policies and methods for this purpose. Such a dilemma reflected the orientation of the political actors, on the one hand, on implementation of some ethno-political model of the state (which was determined by the ruling dynasty and the Government) and, on the other hand, adherence of the latter to compliance of the ethnic or political concepts of a nation. The dilemma of nurturing/contrasting multiculturalism determined a task which was topical to the Habsburg monarchy. That was searching for the ways that would facilitate absorbing, into the bosom of ethno-psychological image of '*us*', of those who got associated with '*them*' through an objective discreteness of ethnic thinking of the titular ethno-nations [3, pp. 27–30].

Since the language represents political and/or cultural symbols of the ethnic communities, steady expansion of functioning of one of them (namely, the state language), accompanied with limiting the fields of publicity of the others (in particular, Ukrainian and Jewish, i.e. Yiddish and Hebrew) in the chronotope under study, was a factor that strengthened the atmosphere of competition of the languages. Though the local governments did not put forward a task of assimilating the ethnic minorities, they pursued discriminatory policies with regard to the language of the ethnic majority and the 'local' languages, and granted language preferences only to some of the actors, the core ethnos (Poles in Galicia and Germans in Bukovyna). The ethno-pluralistic policy of the government encouraged schooling of the ethnic minorities. The models implemented by the state in the field of education were reflected by the state strategy concerned with Jews and Germans [4, pp. 200–214].

The Vienna's ethnic policy in the church and religious segments were determined, on the one hand, by the strategies of protecting and granting equal possibilities for the religious institutions of the minorities, though simultaneously giving preferences to the dominant Catholic church. On the other hand, this policy was characterized by a traditionalism of ethno-confessional communities and an important role of the Christian churches and religious communities in maintaining their self-identification. The official Vienna maintained persistence in attempting to unify a church and a religious space of the country. The attempts by the government to institute control over certain religious churches and communities – the Jewish communities in particular – were a vivid indicator of the government's aggressive actions [5, p. 981].

The identity evolution – from religious self-identification to ethnic one – resulted in genesis of an ethnic catalyst of political mobilization. The territorial identity was also an important feature of pre-nationalistic period. The territory served as a main ingredient and was a factor of an individual's socialization and political mobilization. Like a relevant system of myths and symbols, the collective ideas and the group solidarity were not merely 'associated' with a certain territory – they were formed according to the social and political cultural norms that dominated there. In the absence of statehood of their own and under conditions of sharing a joint territory by the Christian (Ukrainians, Poles, Armenians, Moldavians and Romanians) and non-Christian (Jews and Kraits) communities, a confessional factor intensified the feelings of ethnic identity of the population. The religious identity remained a demarcation line that divided the population of the region into '*us*' and '*them*', saturating the inter-ethnic socio-cultural space. Along with the social and territorial identities, the confessional identity remained to be important; therefore, a church membership of someone usually presupposed his/her ethnicity [6, pp. 161–180].

---

The absolutistic system of administration deliberately deprived the ethnic groups of their political subjectivity, since, in the ethnic terms, the relations between an individual and the state were determined by his/her religion (particularly in the case of Jews). The ethnic and language differences acquired political significance in the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when the ethnic ideology began to emphasize the individual identities of separate ethnic nations, as well their cultures and languages. The emphasis was being made on the national values such as the ethnic interests, security, etc. Rapid spread of their elements was stimulated by the literary works that played a significant role in shaping the ethnic values. The ideas that became known through the prose or poetry had gained their followers or opponents within the ethnic communities. This resulted in escalating controversy with respect to the formulation of national programs and national myths, such as “Tirolians of the East”, “Gente Ruthenus, natione Polonus” and the “Sacred historical messengership of gathering the Russian lands”. The ethnic catalyst of the political mobilization was used by different political circles. This was done, on the one hand, for politicizing the ethnicities (since the above catalyst determined a specific dynamics of the ethnogroup) and, on the other hand, for steering the social protest into the channel of inter-ethnic strife [4, pp. 296–299].

Along with the poor social structuring of the ethnic groups, the differences between the areal and dispersed natures of the residencies of Ukrainians, Poles, Jews and the other immigrant minorities were the factors that affected the relationship of the ethnic occupational structure and the lines of social differentiation. A noteworthy feature of the occupational structure of the population was a vivid cultural division of labour that separated ‘us’ and ‘them’, as it predetermined the main criterion that distinguished certain communities from the public. A significant factor in the opposition ‘us’/‘them’ was the territory, a medium for interaction of the ethnic communities and a ground for their desperate struggle for scarce resources, in particular land. The prerequisites for forming mutual, ‘monochromic’ images of the communities that coexisted side by side (e.g., ‘Ukrainians as farmers and Jews as merchants’) were formed by a conventional triad: a residence, a working activity, and a social ‘we’-experience. In this respect, the economic interdependence of towns and countryside was exceptional; however, it did not change the overall picture of differentiation lines. This was revealed through sacralization of land by the peasants and their disregard of, or even contempt for trade. The religion played the most essential part in the dichotomy of ‘us’/‘them’, since it was a significant part of ethnicity bearers’ everyday life. The dichotomy of town and countryside was complicated by the ethnic and religious confrontations. Due to its communicative function, the language of everyday communication integrated introvert linguistic enclaves for its speakers and, simultaneously, set them apart from the speakers of other languages [7, pp. 385–387].

In the linguistic environment, the indifference of the ‘others’ enlarged rather than reduced the ethno-psychological distance of interests between ‘us’ and ‘them’, although a ‘featureless’ social order prevented from the formation of zones of ethnic conflicts [7, p. 386]. The events of coincidence of the interests of different ethnic and social groups, often antagonistic to one another otherwise, created preconditions for appearance of sustainable myths, as well as auto- and hetero-stereotypes, in the collective consciousnesses of each of the ethnic communities with respect to each other. The social differentiation was preserved due to ethnic nationalisms that used the ethnic histories to develop the images of ‘I’ at different levels – (re)production of our own history, its appropriation by wilful efforts if necessary, and creation of ‘our’ historical narration. The past wrong-doings catalyzed compensation/evaluation patterns. Moreover, the ethno-social ‘saturation’

---

of the definition of *'otherness'* manifested itself in the oppositions of Jews/Christians, urban/rural communities, and the poor/the rich [6, pp. 301–307; 4, pp. 155–156].

The activities of the ethnic parties that articulated the interests of ethno-groups and the strategies for their protection reflected politicization of the *'we'*-experiences. This was accompanied with non-conformism in protecting the rights of *'us'*, thus generating prevalence of contradictions and conflicts in the interaction of different ethnic communities. After all, ethnicizing of policy and inter-ethnic conflicts resulted in the fact that the ethnic parties as conflict groups performed a functional role. Intermediary-representative functions were performed by the party subjects of the ethnic majority. On the one hand, they demonstrated a priority of ethnic identity over the other types of identities and manifested outside a *'we'*-feeling that promoted a permanent character of ethnic socio-cultural distances. On the other hand, they materialized ethno-national interests and determined both a strategy and tactics to protect them. In spite of the differences in the attitudes to the nation-and-state and the vision for the protection of cultural resources of ethnicity, all of the Ukrainian parties showed unanimity in the vision of a future statehood of Ukrainians [2, p. 75].

New deterministic impulses for the further extension of the process of politicization of macro-social groups resulted in Ukrainian and Polish ethnic revivals, and a struggle between the two ethno-nations with regard to the problem of their scopes of influence on the political life in the region. In the chronotope under analysis, Ukrainians and Poles co-existed side by side in different socio-political conditions, but every time they felt distanced from each other and led an offensive policy to the *'aliens'*. Mutual confrontation and structuring of the parties and organizations according to the ethnic lines were considered as axiomatic, and the structuring of the parties remained one of the decisive factors of ethno-political mobilization. An out-group broadcast of their platforms, which implicitly reflected closing up the ideological constants of the party subjects of political processes at the ethnic issues and the *'we'*-feelings, transformed them into conflicting groups. The direct activities of the Polish political parties in the Western Ukrainian lands which tended to defend their own macro-social interests had the same consequences [8, p. 115].

Of equal importance were a correlation of the relationships of different macro-social forces, formation of new competitive/conflicting sparring *'partners'*, or adjustment of relations of old counterparts, especially in the case of Jews. Given their ethnic status and the struggle for the civil equality, the latter refused to be a *'weapon'* of someone ethnic group in its pressuring another group (a *'neighbour'*) and put forward the programs that regulated their mutual interests. Searching for own national and cultural identities of Jews in their Diaspora became an integral component of their ethno-political mobilization. In particular, the Zionist context became a major dominant of the Jewish political life. The political figures of the Jewish community in the Western Ukrainian lands protected the interests of their group in different branches of public life and were not opposed to the group experiences of the *'others'*. The determining factor that intensified political identification and party structuring for Jews were discrepancies in their assessment of the prospects of residency of their ethnic group [4, pp. 209–210].

The German cultural and socio-political organizations were mostly inert observers as to institutionalization of their political actors. Their environment was politically amorphous because, on the one hand, their institutions functioning in the Western Ukrainian lands at that time were culturally oriented and, on the other hand, their work contributed to the preservation of ethnic identity of Germans in the Diaspora and did not opposed them to the nation-and-state. Similar to Germans, the Romanian parties were marginal political figures topped by large landowners who

---

articulated political ideas and ethnic myths. Their ‘aggressive stance’ was directly related to the ethnic revival, and, accordingly, to social recovery of local Ukrainians and Jews. As a result, the Romanian national organizations and party offices considered the growing inter-group competition as the only threat to their interests [4, pp. 214–215].

Variability of the protection of group rights by the ethnic political actors proved that each of the ethno-nations was guided by the goals that met the interests of their own, with no taking into account the aspirations of the ‘*aliens*’. According to the status of the subjects taking part in this protection, we classify political contradictions as clashes between both the unequal (Poles–Jews) and equal (Ukrainians–Jews) in their rights groups. All the conflicts aimed at gaining power as the scarcest resource had the form of manifestations because of the utmost significance of the tasks that their direct participants – the state, on the one hand, and the ethnic and political actors, on the other, – tried to fulfil. Conflicts between the ethno-nations were aggravated by a growing use of the practice of political terror. Its subjects used the ethnic terrorism that performed a defensive function (similar to a ‘guarding nationalism’) of national liberation struggle of the ethnic majority of the region and had an individual form.

The factor of ethnic environment stipulated various ethno-social contradictions. The latter gave rise to various conflict-promoting factors, while the ethnic factor was steadily catalyzed by the Ukrainian–Polish competition for the land. The Polish colonization of Western Ukraine, including Eastern Galicia, made the atmosphere of inter-ethnic tension and competition permanent. In its turn, this testified to extrapolation of the effects and practices of agricultural reforms into the political sphere. The symptoms of ethnic competition for land were seen among the communities that had either unequal or equal statuses. In the first place, the latter case was illustrated by the competition between Ukrainians and Jews. Impoverishing of Ukrainians combined with their awareness of the latent political purpose of the government, especially its attempts to artificially adjust the ethno-demographic composition of population of the region, facilitated formation of a new platform that mobilized macro-social groups. This is proved by the fact that the cooperative movement of the ethnic majority of the region began to compete with ‘*aliens*’ – namely, Jews and Poles – who had long been dominating in trade and small-scale production. This, in turn, strengthened the Ukrainian–Jewish competition which sharpened ethno-social contradictions between the ethnicity bearers of the both groups. Mutual intersection of the ethnic and economic components served as a catalyst of ethno-social struggle for the Western Ukrainian towns and cities. Since the competition for the towns gave the subjects of the ethno-political processes an opportunity to solve their fundamental problems (to fill/strengthen the social and cultural spaces of the cities or to expand/retain their influences), the role of those subjects and their tasks in the struggle were predetermined by the status of the communities involved [6, pp. 482–483].

In the economically poor region, the modernization module of the conflict was marked, firstly, by attempts of Jews and Poles to save their economic preferences in the urban areas and, secondly, by the efforts of the local ethnic majority aimed at changing their social structure and overcoming its poor structuring. Therefore, a possibility for changing the position of Ukrainians in the contemporary ethno-cultural division of labour urged Jews and Poles to defend their ethnic businesses.

Social and cultural disagreements in the ethnic interaction – sometimes growing into conflicts – were caused by both objective and subjective factors. The former included the struggle for the national church under the conditions when ethnic and confessional values were tightly interwoven. The language catalyzing ethno-political mobilization of discriminated groups was another vital

---

element that galvanized disputes concerning the value differences between the subjects of interaction. Those tendencies found their vivid reflection in the struggle of ethnic minorities for a native-language instruction at schools. At the same time, we consider as subjective factors the attempts of the government and the Polish political actors to use religion as an additional means of ethnic assimilation of the '*aliens*' and to implement a Catholic version of ethno-nationalism [4, pp. 306–307].

In our research, the contradictions and conflicts that arose in the process of interaction of different ethnic groups are defined as critical aggravation of their disagreements in the shared reproduction of social reality among the ethnic and religious communities. These differences were based on the violations of system of cultural values in the ethnic, religious or civilizational contexts, which resulted in humiliation of the relevant social statuses. In the chronotope under analysis, it was the ethnicity that served as a relatively independent conflict-provoking factor, whereas the increase in the ethno-national self-consciousness was one of the main reasons of the conflict in its political, economic and cultural fields [6, pp. 453–454].

The peculiarities of electoral participation of the ethnic political actors reflected the nature of inter-ethnic relations and determined the character of after-election policy. As a rule, the election campaigns under analysis tended to polarize and radicalize different groups. This can be exemplified by the 'Galician elections' which did not contribute to stability and representativeness of the electoral process. They were also characterized by various signs of so-called election manifestations – empty promises to electors, which showed that the ethnic leaders were not ready for the realities of post-election political processes. In the conditions of election system of that time, in particular an unstable and unrepresentative political process, the institutional instability of both the Reichsrat and the regional Sejms was combined with the attempts of the dominant ethnic groups to gain control over the institutions, without allowing the members of the other ethnic communities to share the scarce resources (especially the power authority) and solve the important social issues [9, pp. 177, 185]. As the public administration in Galicia represented by the Polish political actors and ethnic elites abused the established system of election, the electoral participation of Ukrainians and Jews was accompanied by a large chain of postelection demarche actions such as signing of petitions, and organization of meeting, rallies and manifestations.

The introduction of universal suffrage did not change the situation radically, since the preservation of political influence of Poles in Galicia was provided by a special 'election geometry' – formation of artificially unequal or two-mandate election districts. In this respect, we can claim that the government used the method of 'Jerrymandering' – a strategy of 'selective geography', which was characterized by a redistricting scheme that favoured a 'majority of minority' [4, p. 393]. In their turn, the subjects of the election campaign and, thus, the new election system proved the existence of a stable though not representative political process.

According to it, one or more weak ethnic groups were subordinated to a dominant group, or the coalition of stronger groups. Therefore the stability was achieved through domination and we can treat the political process as democratic only with regard to those dominant groups. The effectiveness of the governmental control as a catalyst of ethnic contradictions can be traced not only in the interaction of Ukrainians and Poles, but also of Poles and Jews. It was proved by the response of Poles to the new format of Ukrainian–Jewish relationships during the adoption of the new election law and the election campaign to the Reichsrat. Undoubtedly, the ethnic political actors influenced the nature and content of these relationships. This is also proved convincingly by a character of the situation under analysis – the participants of the Ukrainian–Jewish alliance had a

---

conscious or subconscious perception of some connection between the level of ethnic tension, on the one hand, and the power of the local Polish administration in Galicia, on the other [10, pp. 381–383].

We distinguish a number of distinctive features of the activities of the ethnic political actors: protection of their languages, demands to introduce autonomy in its territorial and extra-territorial versions, electoral reforms, gaining of favourable conditions for preserving ethnic cultural resources, and protection of some other group interests. Numerous party institutions or other political figures articulated ethno-nationalisms and represented group interests of the subjects of ethno-political processes. On the one hand, the objectives of the ethnic consolidation aggregated by the ethnic political actors and the ethnic leaders, predetermined a behavioural pattern of the ethnic groups, which was aimed at obtaining all the civic and ethnic rights. On the other hand, the aggressive strategy of the central government was aimed at integrating the subordinate groups into the imperial organism and served as a catalyst that shaped political behaviour patterns of the ethnic groups.

The political activities of the subordinate groups implied the presence of the two main platforms that could help in achieving a compromise. These were cooperation in building the state – or opposition to it. The latter proved to be unacceptable for all of the ethno-national communities living in the Western Ukrainian lands, especially for Jews and Germans. In order to obtain parity of rights with the nation-and-state, all the ethnic minorities – with no exception – strove to create favourable conditions for preserving their own cultural resources. That specified the key criterion of their vision of a possible compromise between the ethnic communities with different statuses – integration into the state as equal subjects of the political nation. Yet, the absence of common large-scale campaigns of the ethnic minorities aimed at their integration into the ethno-political organism of the Habsburg monarchy as equal subjects of this organism, along with a lack of their mutual support in this process, proved that their cooperation was occasional and did not outlined a dominant trend in their bilateral or multilateral interactions [2, p. 73].

The character of interaction of ethno-national communities with the same statuses was modified by discrepancies in the interests of Ukrainians and the immigrant minorities, as well as by their mutual responses to the attempts of one of the subjects of inter-ethnic cooperation to achieve its goals that contradicted the interests of other subordinate groups, as well as by readiness/non-readiness of the latter groups, or their representatives, to protect *'their'* interests. Political positioning of the dispersed communities was also of particular significance, as it conditioned the response patterns of the autochthonous ethnic majority in Western Ukraine.

The preconditions for settlement of the ethnic contradictions were the awareness of causes of the conflict-provoking relationships with *'aliens'*, the degree of readiness for concessions to the *'aliens'* and protection of interests of the *'aliens'*, as well as their refusal to support a third party hostile to a partner selected [7, p. 380]. This specified the key criterion of the ethnic minorities' vision of an inter-ethnic compromise of ethno-national communities with different statuses: integration into *'own'/'alien'* state as equal ethnic subjects of the political nation. The status-role factor of the nature of different initiatives manifested itself through diversification of compromise *'design'* between the *'aliens'* of different statuses. This diversification was achieved by focusing on the proposals associated with changes in the *status quo* and addressed to the nation-and-state by the ethnic political actors. One of the planes where a compromise between the ethno-national communities with different statuses was shaped/became apparent was a part they played in protecting the state against external enemies or, given the nature of international relations in this

---

particular period of history, a proof of readiness to effectively defend territorial integrity and sovereignty of that state. Undoubtedly, demonstrations of political loyalty had also laid the groundwork for compromises of the ethnic minorities with participation of a third party, i.e. the political actors from among the titular ethnic group or the state itself. The initiatives to settle the ethnic conflicts were formed as a common denominator of the two factors. The first was a probable correction of the relations with the third powers, i.e. a result of peculiar relations of a possible ally with the other ethnic minorities and the state. The second factor was the depth of bilateral disagreements of the possible partners, and their desire to neutralize social or other contradictions or, *vice versa*, to acquire a positive experience (at least, in terms of emotionless coexistence).

In the studied chronotope, the prospect of harmonious interaction of the ethnic communities of equal statuses depended on the two factors: (i) a mutual readiness of the groups or their representatives to cooperate in order to implement the tasks essential for them, and (ii) an expression of the out-group empathy [4, p. 395].

The compromises and consensuses of the formalized and unformalized ethnic political actors had peculiarities of their own. In a *‘Bukovynian’* plot of activities of the Western Ukrainian ethno-political subjects, we distinguish a special type of tactics of the ethnic political actors who had achieved a compromise. In this case, the regulatory function of inter-ethnic interaction of the communities evolved from one ethno-political situation to others – the compromise and the cooperation. Preconditions for constructive cooperation of the ethnic minorities were created due to internal bifurcation of the Bukovynian ethnic groups and increase in numbers of the ethnicity bearers that represented a nonconformist and protective ethno-political behavioural patterns. The other preconditions were the emergence in the regional Sejms of their political actors who tried to achieve consensus with the central and regional governments. The features of the *‘Bukovynian consent’* gave some grounds to speak about the presence in the political space of the region of a peculiar *‘Bukovynian paradox’*. This is an ethno-political situation in which the political actors of certain ethnic minorities (mainly those disadvantaged by the government/nation-and-state) expressed their resolute protest by getting distanced from making decisions concerned with the public development of the region. The latter resulted in stalemate situations of choice/absence-of-choice for the ethnic minorities, when both the nation-and-state and the ethnic majority of the region under study sought their loyalty. This also testified to the fact that, unlike inert potential allies, the true partners formed from within the representative government bodies could be found among those political actors who held the same status though belonged to *‘aliens’*.

Thus, the *Bukovynian compromise* of 1910 can be viewed as an example of competition of the political actors for either elected or appointed positions and, therefore, of a need in achieving understanding among the candidates that represented different ethnic groups. Integrative behavioural patterns of the political actors representing Ukrainians, Romanians, Poles, Germans and Jews are quite noticeable in the context of the *‘Bukovynian consent’*. This compromise allowed introducing a general, direct and secret ballot based on the principle of national curiae, according to which the seats were distributed among different Bukovynian ethno-nations in proportion to their population in every curia. The adoption of a new electoral law for the Chernivtsi City Council in 1912, which set the Ukrainian, Romanian, German, and Polish national cadastres, can also be regarded as a result of the *‘Bukovynian consent’* and an interconnected process that democratized the representative government bodies [6, pp. 537–539].

The *‘status-role’* factor determined variability of the conditions that afforded achieving the



---

inter-ethnic compromise between Ukrainians and Poles in Galicia. Besides, the initiatives of their political actors corresponded to integrative behaviour of the ethno-political groups they represented. The mutual agreement on the rules and procedures of the *Galician compromise* of 1914 was the weakest point of the compromise, whereas the agreement concerning the ideological adjustments and the values of the dominant and opposition elites was its most stable point. Hence, taking into account the known criteria of stability (“D. Nash balance”) and optimality (“V. Pareto balance”), we can claim that the pre-compromise stage was stable enough, though hardly optimal.

Therewith, one can see the inability to overcome the legacy of the past and the crisis elements in bilateral relations acquired during the previous interactions at some specific historical stages, and the inability to balance the ‘we’- and ‘they’-interests. This was proved by the struggle between the conservative Polish minority and the democratic Polish–Ukrainian majority in the Sejm, the position of Polish bishops in Galicia, and the statements of the Ukrainian and Polish factions in the Sejm and the Reichsrat. We believe that they resulted from the lack of consistent will of the nation-and-state and the government to find out the reasons for the inter-ethnic crisis, including the claims of Ukrainians and Poles. These circumstances were supplemented with the external factors, i.e. the Balkan conflict and the risk of future Austrian–Russian war, which had created a new political situation in the Polish–Ukrainian relationships [6, pp. 546–547].

The implementation of the Sejm agreement of 1914 showed that the absence of tangible changes in the Polish–Ukrainian relations in Galicia, as well as generally dominating antagonism in the overall relationships of the two ethno-nations were evidences of the fact that the refusal of the state to meet fair requirements of the ethnic majority of the region cancelled any prospects for achieving consensus and compromise among the ethno-nations, even in the nearest future. In contrast to harmonization of the relations that could be achieved due to interaction of the ethnic minorities and represented a ‘horizontal’ configuration of the compromise, the cooperation with the titular ethnic group initiated by the ethnic minorities had demonstrated a ‘vertical’ version of the compromise. Therefore, we classify the compromise of 1914 as artificial, because both the Polish and Ukrainian political actors failed to agree without intervention of a third force on which they depended [4, p. 292].

The impact of unformalized ethnic political actors on the adjustment of group attitudes towards the ‘*aliens*’ was stipulated by the following factors: membership of intelligentsia in the associated groups, active participation in the political parties, direct engagement in the process of outlining/shaping ethnic interests, activities of prestigious trade unions, broadcasting in periodicals of the judgments that significantly influenced the tone of ‘we’-feeling, and the nomination of these periodicals. Since the intelligentsia performed the role of a significant promoter of political culture in the bosom of ethno-nations to which they belonged, defence of their group interests became a determinative trend of their positioning in the ethnic and political processes. The students of regional universities also were creators/propagators of certain types of political culture, while the priests were ‘educators’ of tolerance and direct/indirect creators of a sentiment to the ‘*aliens*’.

In the chronotope under analysis, the orientations towards the ‘*others*’ were developed in the three interrelated areas: (i) the political identification; (ii) the ‘political faith’ (i.e., convincing the ethnicity bearers that the other actors of the political life meant good/bad for them, and a willingness to cooperate with representatives of the ‘*other*’ ethnic groups, or to oppose them); and (iii) orientating as for the ‘rules of game’ (i.e., which of the value or normative aims should be used in the interaction of ethnic and political actors) [6, pp. 625–626; 4, pp. 308–311]. Unlike the formalized ethnic political actors, unformalized actors produced new self-regulation mechanisms of their own and the values determining the necessary criteria for their activities, which went

---

beyond their ethno-social and ethno-political requirements. Besides, the unformalized ethnic political actors had to become opposed to the well-established rival and conflict 'traditions' of the ethnic interaction and stereotypes of the competitive political thinking in the bosom of their own ethno-nations. This was because the practical activities of intelligentsia and their judgments broadcast outside their strata testified something quite different: their majority failed to generate novel ideas and ascend to a new level of culture in the inter-ethnic interaction. Moreover, the scale of architectonics of the political culture proposed by the unformalized ethnic political actors consisted primarily in symbolism. Hence, we can state that their activities were relevant to an activist political culture. Indeed, it was just active participation of the unformalized ethnic political actors in the social life that had laid preconditions for influencing the decision-making with a direct participation of the formalized ethnic political actors.

## References

1. Rotar N, 2005. Polityčna učasť: teoretyko-metodolohični problemy vyznačenná poňattá. Deržava i pravo. **28**: 646–654.
2. Burďak V, 2007. Nacionalni rukhy v Centralno-Skhidnij Jevropi: teoretyko-metodolohični pidkhody do problemy. Forum. **2**: 70–77.
3. Wolf L. The idea of Galicia: History and fantasy in Habsburg political culture. Stanford: Stanford University Press (2010).
4. Monolatiy I, Inši svoji. Polityčna učasť etničnykh aktoriv piznohabsburžykykh Halyčyny i Bukovyny. Ivano-Frankivsk: Lileja-NV (2012).
5. Stourzh G, Die Gleichberechtigung des Voksstämme als Verfassungsprinzip 1848–1918, In: Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918. Band III: Die Völker des Reiches; 2.Teilband. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (1980).
6. Monolatiy I, Razom, ale majže okremo. Vzajemodija etnopolityčnykh aktoriv na zakhidnoukrajinskykh zemľakh u 1867–1914 rr. Ivano-Frankivsk: Lileja-NV (2010).
7. Hon M, Osoblyvosti mižetničnoji vzajemodiji v konteksti polityčnykh procesiv na zakhidnoukrajinskykh zemľakh u mižvojenyj period. Rivne: Volynski oberehy (2006).
8. Urbanitsch P, 1994. Vereine und politische Mobilisierung in Cisleithanien. Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Cluj. **33**: 107–124.
9. Hye HP, Das politische System in der Habsburgermonarchie. Konstituationalismus, Parlamentarismus und politische Partizipation. Praha: Karolinum nakladatelstvi Univerzity Karlovy (1998).
10. Wandruszka A, Österreichs politische Struktur. Die Entwicklung der Parteien und politischen Bewegungen, In: Geschichte der Republik Österreich, hrg. von Heinrich Benedikt (1954).

---

Monolatii Ivan S. Institutionalization of ethnic political actors in Austria-Hungary: The examples of Galicia and Bukovyna, 2014, Sci. Horiz. **2**: a – j.

***Анотація:** Досліджено інституційні процеси у сфері етнополітики Австро-Угорщини щодо забезпечення прав та потреб етнічних акторів і процеси зовнішньої та внутрішньої інституціоналізації українських, польських, єврейських, румунських і німецьких політичних акторів Галичини і Буковини. Охарактеризовано нормативно-правову основу формалізації політичної участі громадян і пріоритети політики держави в умовах етнічного пробудження. Простежено тенецу етнічного каталізатора політичної мобілізації, визначено співвідношення професійної структури та ліній соціального розмежування в етнічному вимірі. Проаналізовано платформи та стратегії діяльності політичних партій, створених за етнічним принципом. Розглянуто мобілізаційні фактори електоральної та протестної участі, каталізатори конкуренції між різностатусними етнонаціональними спільнотами, варіативність захисту групових інтересів, компроміси та консенсуси формалізованих і неформалізованих етнічних акторів.*