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NALYVAICHENKO
The fight for the future





CRAMON-TAUBADEL
Before Putin's war
with bombs, there
was a war with
disinformation

GRIGORY
YAVLINSKY
Crimea: Eight
years later





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Offshore motive
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EXPERT ARTICLES

The fight for the future	4
VIOLA VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL Before Putin's war with bombs, there was a war with disinformation	6
GRIGORY YAVLINSKY Crimea: Eight years later	7
MYKHAILO GONCHAR Offshore motive for the occupation o Ukraine's Crimea	8 f
NEIL KENT Orthodoxy, the Kremlin and Ukraine	9
JAMES SHERR The Putin obsession and the probler of Russia	10 n
STEVEN PIFER Why Putin went to war against Ukrai	12 ne
YANA PRYMACHENKO Ukraine is not Russia vs One Nation political prose as the prelude to the Russo-Ukrainian War	1 3 :
ELEANOR KNOTT From annexation to war	14
KATERYNA IVASHCHENKO-STADNIK Debunking the constructed war against Ukraine: Evidence from the pre-invasion Crimea and Donbas	15
IHOR HURAK "Policy of appeasement" as one of the factors of Russia's aggression against Ukraine	17
EVHEN TSYBULENKO War of civilizations	18
ROMAN MARTYNOVSKYY The logic of barbarism and human rights	19
YORDAN GUNAWAN The legitimacy and recognition of Crimea: A conundrum	21
JAMES RODGERS Russia and Ukraine: War and media	22
VICTOR LIAKH & ILONA KHMELEVA Ukrainian resistance to Russian aggression: What can civil society representatives do?	23

DEBORAH SANDERS The Russian invasion of Ukraine: Implications for the Black Sea	24
KRISTIAN ÅTLAND Russia's maritime expansionism in the Black Sea region	26
BORYS BABIN Legal assessment of Russian ongoing aggression in the Black and Azov Seas	27
SAJAL KABIRAJ Russia-Ukraine conflict and its impact on global supply chains	31
MAKSYM PALAMARCHUK Occupation of Crimea: Strategic consequences	32
KESTUTIS KILINSKAS Hybrid warfare: An orientating or misleading concept in analysing Russia's military actions in Ukraine / in Crimea?	33
JULIA KAZDOBINA Push for Crimea's liberation despite the war	34
ANDRII RYZHENKO Russian Crimean Bastion and its role in the ongoing invasion in Ukrain	35 e
MAKSYM KYIAK Crimea will be free	37
RIANA TEIFUKOVA The geopolitical implications of Russia's aggression against Ukraine	38
MEHMET SEYFETTIN EROL Meanings of Crimean geopolitics in regional-global politics	39
OLEKSANDR SUKHODOLIA The Ukrainian Crimea and the clash of liberal democracy and autocracy	4 1
DMITRY I. UZNARODOV Socio-economic development of the Republic of Crimea in 2018-2020	43
YEVHENIIA HORIUNOVA Social changes in Crimea occupied	44

Violation of the collective rights of the Crimean Tatar people is a crime against humanity	46
FILIZ TUTKU AYDIN Crimea, Crimean Tatars and the Russian invasion of Ukraine	48
NATALYA BELITSER Crimean Tatars and occupation of Crimea	50
VEIKKO JARMALA Crimean Estonians	51
SERHII HROMENKO Putin misuses the history of Crimea in the war against Ukraine	52
NIKITA LOMAGIN Russia's historic relations with Crime	53 ea
SERGEI V. MOSHKIN Why did Khrushchev transfer Crimes to Ukraine?	54 a
OLENA SNIGYR Crimean narratives of Russian historical memory	56
ELENA KAYUKOVA Fresh water of the Crimean Peninsu	57 ıla
ALEKSANDER PANASIUK & HALYNA ZUBRYTSKA Crisis situation of the tourism industry in Crimea	58
MARIA PIECHOWSKA Cultural heritage under threat in Ukraine	59
ELMIRA ABLYALIMOVA-CHYIHOZ & DENYS YASHNYI Colonization through destruction and distortion: the case of the Bakhchisaray Khan's Palace	60
INGA ZAKSAUSKIENE Enemies and traitors: The role of Ukraine in the Soviet Union dissoluti	62 ion
KARI LIUHTO A paranoid war with absurd	63

justifications



by Russia

IHOR HURAK

"Policy of appeasement" as one of the factors of Russia's aggression against Ukraine

Expert article • 3203

hortly after the large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Western officials, diplomats, and experts have voiced concerns that V. Putin may soon order an attack on an EU/NATO country. As the incumbent Russian president has crossed a number of "red lines" over the past twenty years, such a development is quite possible. In the context of the threats outlined above, the article focuses on the steps the West has taken to heighten the Kremlin's geopolitical ambitions and indirectly contribute to what is happening in Ukraine.

For a long time, politicians and diplomats of the leading Western countries did not understand or pretended not to understand the threatening trends in Russia's development. Back in 2004, having analysed Russian internal changes under Putin's rule, Z. Brzezinski called him the "Moscow Mussolini". Putin's words that the collapse of the USSR was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the XX century (2005) made political scientists and experts suspect him of seeking to restore the Soviet Union¹. In February 2007, the Russian president delivered the infamous "Munich speech", which is considered a turning point in Russia's foreign policy. The above-mentioned steps of the official Kremlin did not receive a proper reaction from the West.

Western leaders also failed to respond adequately to Russia's illegal actions against Georgia in August 2008. Leaders of the leading EU countries blocked the granting of MAP to Ukraine and Georgia in April 2008, yet during the EU-Russia summit in November 2008 they have expressed their support for the Russian Federation, including plans to build new foundations for European security together with Moscow. In July 2009, Presidents B. Obama and D. Medvedev officially launched a policy of "reset", and in September 2009 the US President announced that the United States was abandoning plans to build radars and missile interceptors bases in Poland and the Czech Republic. In November 2009, the European Union and the Russian Federation launched the Partnership for Modernization initiative. In October 2010, the leaders of Germany, Russia and France discussed the creation of a united area of cooperation in the field of economy and security. Such steps of the West gave the Kremlin leadership confidence and they were one of the reasons why Putin ordered to invade and occupy Crimea in February 2014.

For several months after the Russian blitzkrieg in Crimea, the West continued to pursue the "policy of appeasement". The situation changed after the plane on an MH-17 flight was shot. Then Russia faced sectoral sanctions, it was excluded from the G8, the EU refused to hold summits with Russia and suspended negotiations on a new agreement, the Russian delegation was denied access to the PACE. In democracy, such restrictions would become a severe blow to its leadership and force it to renounce illegal actions. However, Putin's authoritarian regime, strengthened by petrodollars and systematic

propaganda, has coped with them. However, it is important to state that the restrictions were not aimed at Russia's leadership directly, the government managed to evade many sanctions, while sanctions on the Kremlin's important energy bloc had little effect².

The limited sanctions policy has proved ineffective, and the West has been willing to restart the dialogue with Moscow instead of stepping up in response to further Russian violations and misconduct. This was the pattern created mainly by the idea of the President of France to build a new security and defense architecture" (2018) together with Russia ", the return of the Russian delegation to full participation in PACE (2019), the US President's proposal to return Russia to the G7 (2019). Russia saw such initiatives as manifestations of the West's weakness, and in February 2022, Putin ordered a large-scale invasion of Ukraine. In response to this move, leading Western powers have imposed an unprecedented list of sanctions against Russia. Economic experts agree that sanctions pressure could lead to Russia's default in the near future. Combined with the negative effects of the military campaign in Ukraine, this could potentially lead to the disappearance of Russia as it is now from the modern world map.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the "policy of appeasement" that the leading Western capitals have long demonstrated toward Russia has not been a key factor in Russia's aggression against Ukraine. At the same time, such a misguided approach certainly played a negative role. Now there is a need for right conclusions. The current events around Ukraine marked the beginning of the formation of a new world order. In this context, it is fundamentally important to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine that renounced nuclear weapons back in 1994 and became the object of aggression later. To form a sustainable "coordinate system" on the European continent, the United States and the EU must change their approach to addressing issues in Eastern Europe. Along with financial, humanitarian and military assistance, Ukraine should receive at least the EU candidate status. Ukrainians also deserve a MAP. On the other hand, given Russia's barbaric treatment of Ukraine, the question of Russia's role in the UN Security Council must be raised. It should be borne in mind that the current UN Charter lists the USSR, not Russia, among the five permanent members of this body.

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The EU has not imposed restrictions on Gazprom, which since Putin's presidency has been and remains the financial base and instrument of influence for his team.



It is worth noting that a number of Putin's allegations and actions indicate that he prefers the Russian Empire with its unitary system over the formally federal USSR.